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Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation 
 
Abstract 
 
While best known today for his theories of discourse, hegemony and populism, Ernesto 
Laclau also has a distinctive theory of representation, which is developed in On Populist 
Reason in particular. Going beyond conventional conceptions of political representation, 
Laclau takes representation to be a general category and not just limited to formal political 
institutions, and he takes representation to be performative in that it also brings about what is 
represented. This paper examines the implications of this conceptualization of representation 
for Laclau’s theory of populism. Laclau takes populism to be exemplary of his conception of 
representation because populism is a discourse that brings into being what it claims to 
represent: the people. This is important for current debates about populism and the crisis of 
democratic institutions, whether domestic or international. The aim here is to show how our 
conceptions of representation inform how we think about populism and liberal democracy, 
and specifically about populism as a threat to liberal democracy at the domestic or global 
level. I show this in the context of a reading of Jan-Werner Müller’s influential critique of 
populism. 
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Representing the People: Laclau as a Theorist of Representation 
 
While better known for his theories of discourse, hegemony and populism, Ernesto Laclau 
also has a distinct theory of representation, which is developed in On Populist Reason in 
particular.1 Laclau goes beyond conventional understandings of political representation in 
two ways: first, he does not limit representative politics to formal political institutions; and, 
second, he takes the act of representation to constitute – or construct – what is represented. In 
this article, I analyze the implications of thinking about representation in this way. I argue 
that Laclau provides us with an insightful theory of representation, but I also examine some 
of the limitations of it, suggesting ways of addressing those limitations. Laclau himself links 
his theory of representation to populism, and current debates about populism often link the 
emergence of populism to a crisis of representative institutions. Using Jan-Werner Müller’s 
recent influential work on populism, I show how Laclau’s theory of representation allows us 
to see what is at stake in current debates about populism and, especially, the liberal critique of 
populism as anti-pluralist. In these debates, the concept of “populism” is often ambiguous, 
the result being that it is difficult to distinguish populism from what is not populism, let alone 
distinguish between different types of populism. As Frank Stengel, David MacDonald and 
Dirk Nabers point out, this is particularly so in IR scholarship.2 By analyzing Laclau’s and 
Müller’s theories of populism through the lens of representation, I hope to clarify some of the 
conceptual issues surrounding populism as well as what is at stake when different 
conceptions of populism and representation are brought into play. 
 
                                                          
1 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 
2 Frank A. Stengel, David B. MacDonald and Dirk Nabers, ‘Introduction: Analyzing the 
Nexus Between Populism and International Relations’, in Frank A. Stengel, David B. 
MacDonald and Dirk Nabers (eds), Populism and World Politics: Exploring Inter- and 
Transnational Dimensions (London: Palgrave, 2019), pp. 2-3. 
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Representation and Populism 
 
With his conception of representation, Laclau breaks with those who think of political 
representation in terms of the correspondence between principals’ (citizens, constituencies, 
voters) interests and the agents acting on their behalf. When mediated through the proper 
political institutions, this relationship between represented and representatives can then be 
labelled democratic.3 Some, but not all, of this literature relies on a view of rational agents 
seeking to maximize their interests.4 Laclau rejects this model of rational man, but his theory 
of representation goes beyond that to reject any conception of political representation that 
takes representation as a matter of correspondence (or not) between a state of affairs and the 
representation of that state of affairs. In other words, we do not first have the interests of 
individuals or of the people and then a representation of those interests; rather, representation 
– whether by social activists or by formal representatives – is constitutive of what is 
represented. 
Contemporary political theory of representation has seen two developments over the 
last two decades. There is, first, the so-called representative turn.5 Here, representation is 
placed at the heart of democracy and politics, and representation is not reduced to a matter of 
formal political institutions, whether domestic or international. So, for example, one might 
                                                          
3 For recent examples, see Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation,” American 
Political Science Review 97:4 (2003), pp. 515-28; and Andrew Rehfeld, “Towards a General 
Theory of Political Representation,” Journal of Politics 68:1 (2006), pp. 1-21. 
4 For instance, Navin Kartik, Richard Van Weelden, and Stephane Wolton, “Electoral 
Ambiguity and Political Representation,” American Journal of Political Science 61: 4 (2017), 
pp. 958-70. 
5 Nadia Urbinati and Mark E. Warren, “The Concept of Representation in Democratic 
Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008), pp. 387-412; and Sofia Näsström, 
“Where is the Representative Turn Going?” European Journal of Political Theory 10:4 
(2011), pp. 501-10. 
6 
 
think of Oxfam or U2’s Bono as engaged in representative politics.6 The extension of the 
categories of democratic and political representation beyond formal institutions has been 
facilitated by a change in the unit of analysis from institutions, elections, officials, and so on, 
to “representative claims,” to use Michael Saward’s now influential terminology.7 Doing so 
takes us beyond those such as Jane Mansbridge and Andrew Rehfeld who – while gesturing 
beyond formal political institutions – want to retain the link between democratic 
representation and formal institutions.8 
A second development in contemporary political theory of representation is what is 
sometimes referred to as a constructivist turn. Here, representation is taken, not as the 
reflection of already existing interests and identities, but as constitutive of those interests and 
identities.9 In Saward’s terminology, a representative claim is a performative act that brings 
into being what it purports to represent.10 This idea is at the heart of Saward’s and Lisa 
Disch’s works, where they conceptualize political representation as “shape-shifting” 
(Saward) and “mobilizing” (Disch) constituencies.11 Intellectually, Laclau is part of this 
constructivist turn, even if he published well before the turn, and even if few scholars 
working within the constructivist turn engage with his work.12 
                                                          
6 Laura Montanaro, Who Elected Oxfam? A Democratic Defense of Self-Appointed 
Representatives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Michael Saward, The 
Representative Claim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 148-50. 
7 Saward, The Representative Claim; Michael Saward, “Shape-Shifting Representation,” 
American Political Science Review 108:4 (2014), pp. 723-36. 
8 Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation;” and Rehfeld, “Towards a General Theory of 
Political Representation.” 
9 Lisa Disch, “The ‘Constructivist Turn’ in Democratic Representation: A Normative Dead-
End?” Constellations 22:4 (2015), pp. 487-99; Lisa Disch, Mathijs van de Sande, and Nadia 
Urbinati, The Constructivist Turn in Political Representation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2019); and Näsström, “Where is the Representative Turn Going?”. 
10 Saward, The Representative Claim. 
11 Saward, “Shape-Shifting Representation;” and Lisa Disch, “Towards a mobilization 
conception of political representation’, American Political Science Review 105:1 (2011), pp. 
100-14. 
12 For an exception, see Lisa Disch, “The Impurity of Representation and the Vitality of 
Democracy,” Cultural Studies 26:2-3 (2012), pp. 207-22. 
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In his earlier work, Laclau connected populism to a crisis of transformism, that is, the 
inability of a system to pacify resistance to it by transforming antagonisms into positions 
within the (liberal-democratic) system – in short, a crisis of representation.13 In his major 
work on populism, On Populist Reason, Laclau explicitly links representation to populism. 
He writes that “[t]the crisis of representation … is at the root of any populist, anti-
institutional outburst.”14 The idea is the same: the populist articulation of particular demands 
as the demands of “the people” is possible because they are not represented within the system 
as particular demands. He adds that the category of populism is the royal road to 
understanding not only “the nature and logic of the formation of collective identities” and 
“the ontological constitution of the political as such,” but also the category of 
representation.15 What populism and representation share, according to Laclau, is a 
performative dimension: a populist discourse constructs a people; and a representative claim 
does not simply reflect an already constituted state of affairs, but simultaneously constitutes 
it. Populist discourse is performative because the people does not exist independently of the 
claims to represent the people: “the construction of a ‘people’ would be impossible without 
the operation of mechanisms of representation.”16 The people is representational in this sense: 
it is an effect of representative claims. Where others, like Müller, interpret the 
representational character of the populist people in terms of manipulation, for Laclau it lays 
bare the anti-essentialist character of politics more generally. All politics is representational, 
and populism – properly understood – shows us that politics is about the representation, or 
construction, of identities and interests rather than their proper reflection in political 
institutions.  
                                                          
13 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: NLB, 1977). 
14 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 137. 
15 Ibid., ix, 67, 163. 
16 Ibid., 161. 
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Critics of populism also connect representation and populism. Müller is a particularly 
influential voice in academic and popular debates about populism and democracy.17 Müller 
places populism within the contemporary crisis of representative democracy. For him, 
populism concerns the relationship between elites and the people: populism is a critique of 
(current) political elites and their inability to properly represent the people.18 At the same 
time, populists claim “that they, and they alone, represent the people.”19 The claim to 
represent the people is a form of identity politics, according to Müller: it is a claim about the 
moral character of the people, and it is a claim that represents, and thereby fixes, the limits of 
the people in a certain way that is “exclusionary” and anti-pluralist.20 In this way, populism 
and representation are closely linked. Echoing political elites, public commentators and the 
mainstream media, Müller decries the dangers of the populist “peril:” 
 
The danger to democracies today … is populism – a degraded form of democracy that 
promises to make good on democracy’s highest ideals (‘Let the people rule!’). The 
                                                          
17 Jan-Werner Müller, “‘The people Must be Extracted from Within the People:’ Reflections 
on Populism,” Constellations 21:4 (2014), pp. 483-93; Jan-Werner Müller, “Behind the New 
German Right,” The New York Review of Books Online, 14 April 2016, available online at:  
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/04/14/behind-new-german-right-afd/; Jan-Werner 
Müller, “Trump, Erdoğan, Farage: The attractions of populism for politicians, the dangers for 
democracy,” The Guardian, 2 September 2016, available online at 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/02/trump-erdogan-farage-the-attractions-of-
populism-for-politicians-the-dangers-for-democracy; and Jan-Werner Müller, What Is 
Populism? (London: Penguin, 2017). For similar recent critiques of populism, see Paulina 
Ochoa Espejo, “Populism and the People,” Theory & Event 20:1 (2017), pp. 92-9; William A. 
Galston, Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2018), especially chapter 3; Fabio Wolkenstein, “Populism, Liberal 
Democracy and the Ethics of Peoplehood,” European Journal of Political Theory AOP 
November 20, 2016, DOI: 10.1177/1474885116677901. 
18 Müller, What Is Populism?, p. 2. 
19 Ibid., 3. 
20 Ibid. 
9 
 
danger comes, in other words, from within the democratic world [and] the end result 
is a form of politics that is blatantly antidemocratic.21 
 
Although Müller writes here of “democracy,” it is clear from the context that he has in mind 
liberal democracy. Like Müller, others also see populism as a response to a crisis of the 
institutions of the liberal world order.22 This is what we see when leaders of the European 
Union represent populism as a threat to economic and political stability and to the ensemble 
of rights established at the level of the Union. Populism is seen as the response to the 
discrepancy between, on one hand, the promise of the liberal democratic institutions to 
mediate social and political conflicts and, on the other hand, the realities of globalization for 
big sectors of the population. The populism of “my people first” is here interpreted as a 
reaction to the failure of liberal democratic institutions to represent the people as opposed to 
the interests of political and economic elites. For Müller, who defends liberal democracy 
from a position on the Left, the problem is neoliberalism and technocracy, and the problem 
with populists is their failure to appreciate liberal democratic institutions and party 
competition as the framework for developing alternatives to neoliberalism and technocracy.23 
In the following, I analyze Laclau’s theory of representation in order to show how it 
contributes to our understanding of the category of political representation. While broadly in 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 11 and 6. 
22 For instance, Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged,” 
Foreign Affairs 96:3 (2017), 36-44; Francis Fukuyama and Robert Muggah, “Populism Is 
Poisoning the Global Liberal Order,” The Globe and Mail, 29 January 29 2018, available 
online at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/populism-is-poisoning-the-global-
liberal-order/article37777370/; G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?” 
International Affairs 94:1 (2018), pp. 7-23; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Will the Liberal Order 
Survive?” Foreign Affairs 961 (2017), pp. 10-16. 
23 Similarly, Christopher Bickerton, “Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or 
Complements?” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20:2 
(2017), pp. 186-206; Daniele Carami, “Will Vs. Reason: The Populist and Technocratic 
Forms of Political Representation and Their Critique to Party Government,” American 
Political Science Review 111:1 (2017), pp. 54-67. 
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agreement with Laclau’s approach, I also identify its limitations and show how they might be 
addressed. I then connect Laclau’s theory of representation to populism. Laclau and Müller 
share a view of the people as representational, but they draw very different conclusions from 
this. Müller thinks of the populist representation of the people as the imposition, from above, 
of a particular image of the people onto the pluralism of society. For Laclau, representation is 
not unidirectional, and so the success of any representation of the people depends on the 
uptake by society. What is more, to say that the people is representational is to acknowledge 
that it will always be heterogeneous and divided. While this is no guarantee against 
homogenizing representations of the people, Laclau’s theory of representation helps explain 
what defenders of liberal democracy, such as Müller, find perilous about populism as well as 
showing the limitations of their critique of populism. 
 
Laclau’s Theory of Representation 
 
Laclau’s theory of representation breaks with conventional approaches in two ways: first, 
representation is a general category; and, second, representation is constitutive of what is 
represented, whether it is the interests of the people or the identities of social groups. 
Laclau’s background is in Marxism, and so I start from how he moves beyond more 
traditional Marxist conceptions of representation. One can link this back to his formative 
years on the Argentinian Left in the 1950s and 1960s: the liberal oligarchies in Latin America 
taught him the importance of mass movements and that representation is more than formal 
institutions, but he also rejected the orthodox Marxist view that reduces politics to the 
representation of the true interests of the working class. 
 
From Representation to Articulation, and Back 
11 
 
 
Laclau first became more widely known outside Marxist circles with his and Chantal 
Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy from 1985. That book contains two conceptions 
of representation, one of which they reject. There is, first, “the model of representation” they 
find in Marxist thought. According to this model, representation, and specifically political 
representation, is “a bare stage on which characters constituted beyond them – the classes – 
wage their struggle.”24 Representation is conceived as a surface reflecting an underlying 
essence: the class character of contemporary capitalist society. Nothing happens in 
representation, which is nothing but a transparent medium and is wholly governed by 
underlying logics of History. If representation distorts the underlying class contradictions of 
capitalist society, it can be explained as the cunning of capitalism. “In this way,” Laclau and 
Mouffe conclude, “all concrete problems concerning the practice of representation are simply 
eliminated.”25 This is so because “the practice of representation” is reduced to a secondary 
and derivative status. One finds this in various forms, but perhaps the crudest form is the 
formulation of the base-superstructure model in Marx’s “Preface” to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, where the superstructures are both distinguished from and 
reduced to the economic base with its logics of the mode of production.26 
This model of representation is not limited to Marxism, and it exists whenever the 
world is divided into two levels: representation and what is represented, for instance a portrait 
and the person portrayed, human rights institutions and human dignity, or ideology and the 
mode of production. The level of representation is at once distinguished from and reduced to 
what is represented. The process of representation is unidirectional: not only does the level of 
                                                          
24 Ernesto Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), p. 65. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London: Verso, 1990), pp. 
5-10. 
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representation not affect the represented, but representation can be reduced to a reflection of 
the represented, even if the representation is distorted. According to this view of 
representation, there is no reason to study representation in its own right, only as the true or 
false reflection of something else, that is, as a symptom. Like so many other post-
structuralists, Laclau and Mouffe reject this model of representation.27 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe oppose to this model of 
representation what they call articulation, which refers to “any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice.”28 
Articulation is performative; it does not merely reflect but constitutes what is articulated. On 
this view, collective identities are “not the expression of a common underlying essence but 
the result of political construction and struggle.”29 Articulation is not a level of the social, 
distinct from, and reduced to, some underlying logic; instead, articulation is the terrain in 
which the social is constituted. 
When Laclau and Mouffe speak of hegemony, it is as an articulatory practice. 
Hegemony, or hegemonic articulation, articulates identities in a new way. This is what 
hegemony and counter-hegemony are about: the dis-articulation and re-articulation of 
identities. The social is not taken as a given social fact but is constituted through articulatory 
practices. Articulation is neither distinct from nor reduced to the social; it is constitutive of 
the social, what Laclau and Mouffe also refer to as discourse.30 When Laclau and Mouffe 
refer to the social or to discourse, they often refer to social identities, but discourse also refers 
to interests, norms, institutions, economic “laws,” and so forth. The turn from representation 
                                                          
27 Claire Colebrook, Ethics and Representation: From Kant to Post-Structuralism 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999). 
28 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 105. 
29 Ibid., 65. 
30 Ibid., 105. Note that, whether we are talking about representation or discourse, they are 
material. Ibid., 107-9; and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, “Post-Marxism without 
Apologies,” New Left Review 166 (1987), pp. 86-9. 
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to articulation is not a simple rejection of representation, however. Rather, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy makes a critique of a traditional model of representation and goes on, in the 
rest of the book, to treat representation as articulation: as performative and constitutive and as 
a general category.31 
Laclau and Mouffe’s engagement with the category of representation thus mirrors 
their engagement with the category of hegemony. They deconstruct the Marxist model of 
representation and then argue that representation is a general category. For them, the 
conception of representation as performative and constitutive is not simply another 
conception of representation, but a general theory of how representation works.32 The 
argument is similar to the deconstructive argument Laclau and Mouffe make about the 
category of hegemony, which they argue is not a secondary category, but general and 
constitutive. As I will show below, Laclau makes a similar argument about populism, which 
he argues shows something general about politics, namely that all politics is representational. 
 
Towards a Systematic Theory of Representation as Performative 
 
In his later work, Laclau developed a more systematic theory of representation as 
performative and constitutive.33 Populism and the construction of a people are, for Laclau, the 
paradigmatic example of representation as performative and constitutive: 
 
                                                          
31 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 58, 119, 121. 
32 Laclau and Mouffe’s argument mirrors that of Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
33 Ernesto Laclau, Emancipation(s) (London: Verso, 1996), pp. 85, 87, 97-100; Laclau, On 
Populist Reason, pp. 157-64; Ernesto Laclau, “Reply,” Cultural Studies 26: 2-3 (2012), pp. 
391-4. Critically, see Bickerton, “Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?;” 
Disch, “The Impurity of Representation and the Vitality of Democracy.” 
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Constructing a ‘people’ is not simply the application to a particular case of a general 
theory of representation which could be formalized at a more abstract level; it is, on 
the contrary, a paradigmatic case, because it is the one which reveals representation 
for what it is: the primary terrain of constitution of social objectivity.34 
 
Laclau’s theory of populism emerges from a critique of the way in which Marxist 
theory has relegated populism to a secondary status in much the same way as hegemony and 
representation. Laclau’s work can be understood as an attempt to understand populism 
through a revision of Marxist categories in the first instance and, later, as a generalization of 
the logic of populism as a general logic of hegemony and politics. For Laclau, “populism is 
the royal road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political 
as such.”35 This is so because populism reveals representation as the terrain in which 
identities – here, the people – are constituted. 
Whereas the representation of classes is treated by Marxist theory as the reflection of 
already existing interests, the representation of the people becomes a paradigmatic case of the 
representation of an entity – “the people” – which is brought into being by invoking it. For 
Laclau, populism – and any discourse in which the construction of a people is central, for 
instance fascism – are phenomena that Marxist theory cannot account for, and which Marxist 
practice has difficulties dealing with, because Marxist theory and practice takes 
representation to be the reflection of already constituted interests. These interests are missing 
in the case of the people, which is not real in the same way that classes are taken to be real, 
and so populism becomes a form of misrepresentation: it papers over class antagonism 
through the false promise of a shared interest of the people. By doing so, populism functions 
                                                          
34 Laclau, On Populist Reason, p. 163. 
35 Ibid., 67. 
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ideologically to direct attention away from the class nature capitalism. In the context of 
debates about populism, it is the constitutive character of representation that makes Marxists 
and liberals wary of populist representations of the people. For Marxists, populists 
manipulate the working class into thinking they are first and foremost part of the people and 
divided from the working class in other countries; for liberals, populists manipulate citizens 
to think that they are divided into a “true” people and a “corrupt” one, and that they are not 
all in the same boat defined by liberal democratic institutions. Laclau agrees with Marxists 
about the antagonistic nature of politics, but he disagrees with them on the nature of 
antagonism; he disagrees with liberals because he thinks that they do not acknowledge the 
inherently antagonistic nature of politics and society. 
With Laclau we get a general theory of representation as performative. However, I 
would like to address three closely connected issues with Laclau’s theory of representation. 
They concern (a) what is beyond representation, (b) the plasticity of representation, and (b) 
the sovereignty of the representative. All of these issues are important for how we understand 
populism and the representation of the people. 
(a) For Laclau, there is nothing beyond representation, or, to be precise, there is no 
being that is extra-representational. Laclau and Mouffe distinguish between the being and the 
existence of something.36 The being of something – for instance, “this computer” or “the 
British state” – has a being for us insofar as it is part of a meaningful practice, what they call 
discourse. The distinction is introduced in response to those who argued that, for Laclau and 
Mouffe, everything is discourse. The distinction posits something beyond discourse, namely 
“existence”, for instance an earthquake. However, the distinction gets Laclau and Mouffe 
embroiled in a problem they sought to avoid by rejecting the notion of something extra-
                                                          
36 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 82-4; see also Thomas Decreus, 
“Beyond Representation? A Critique of the Concept of the Referent,” Representation 49: 1 
(2013), pp. 33-43. 
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representational: either the distinction posits some presence beyond representation, namely 
the category of existence and the distinction between being and existence; or, if the category 
and the distinction are themselves representational, the representational is extended to what 
was supposedly beyond representation. It is more than a philosophical problem, however. For 
instance, one might think of “the people” as the being of the existence of “flesh and blood 
individuals.” However, this would be to reintroduce a hierarchical distinction between a 
primary reality (flesh and blood individuals) and a secondary and derived representation (the 
people), and we would be back with the model of representation that Laclau and Mouffe 
rejected.37 
The solution to this problem in Laclau’s theory of hegemony is to think of 
representation not as articulation of meanings out of the blue, but as re-articulation of already 
existing meanings. There is always something beyond any particular representation, namely 
already existing representations, which are being re-represented and, as such, rearticulated. 
Representation always takes place in a terrain that is partly sedimented, “citing” existing 
identities and structures. To say that representation is performative, and that it “constructs” 
what it represents, does not mean that representation constructs what is represented ex nihilo. 
Rather, representation re-presents already existing meanings, practices and structures. Here 
we can think of Derrida’s work on the performative, where the performative is interpreted as 
iteration, that is, as re-articulation or re-representation. What is more, the performative 
representation gets its force from citing representations of, for instance, the people that are 
already taken as authoritative.38 
                                                          
37 Lasse Thomassen, British Multiculturalism and the Politics of Representation (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2017), pp. 33-6. 
38 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988); Judith 
Butler and Ernesto Laclau, “The Uses of Equality,” in Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart 
(eds), Laclau: A Critical Reader (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 329-44. 
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(b) A related point concerns the plasticity of representation. To explain how a 
discourse comes into being, Laclau and Mouffe distinguished between moments and 
elements. A discourse is made of up moments, which are “differential positions, insofar as 
they appear articulated within a discourse.” Elements refer to “any difference that is not 
discursively articulated,” and, because meaning is discursive, elements must be devoid of 
meaning (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 105). Laclau’s style of writing is often to assert a strong 
distinction only to qualify it later, either explicitly or implicitly. This is also the case here 
when Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 106-7, 110, 113) later point out that there are no pure 
moments and no pure elements. Pure moments would be fixed as part of a fixed structure, and 
it would be impossible to dis-articulate them from their current articulation. Pure elements 
would not have any being and would not even be noise, as noise is already discursively 
articulated (as noise). Put differently, we are always somewhere between elements and 
moments. To use Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 113) phrase, any signifier is more or less 
“floating” and can be articulated in new ways, but no signifier is completely free-floating. 
Representation takes place in this partly sedimented, partly floating terrain. whether the result 
of a representative claim is to reproduce existing meanings or to change them, representation 
starts from and is limited by existing representations. 
(c) When discussing representation and populism, Laclau makes a distinction between 
concept and name.39 While a concept is meant to reflect an essence in a transparent way, a 
name performatively constitutes what is named; in Laclau’s words, “the name becomes the 
ground of” what is named.40 We have here the opposition between the traditional conception 
of representation where, in the case of the concept, the concept and the essence it represents 
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are united in a homology; and, in the case of the name, representation is performative and 
fully plastic.  
What Laclau does not address is the fact that naming as a pure performative assumes 
a sovereign subject – the namer – who can shape the world at his will (and this image of the 
sovereign subject is usually gendered). However, this subject can only be constituted as 
sovereign and as capable of naming through a process of recognition, which makes the 
subject dependent on other subjects and on structures within society – and, so, less than fully 
sovereign. What is more, naming only works insofar as it draws on existing names and 
norms, and insofar as it is recognized by others as an act of naming.41 Pure naming, if it were 
possible, would be a kind of private language that would not resonate with others. Naming 
always takes place within an already partly sedimented terrain that limits what can 
meaningfully be named in one way or another. This is the challenge facing left-wing 
populists in Europe where “populism” and speaking in the name of “the people” are usually 
associated with right-wing populism and even fascism. As a result, even the left-populist 
Podemos, which is inspired by Laclau’s theory of populism, have avoided representing 
themselves as populist.42 
While always performative, representation cannot be reduced to a sovereign act of 
naming. There is a tendency in Laclau to suggest that the populist leader constructs the 
people in this way,43 but, as he notes elsewhere, naming is always a form of re-naming.44 This 
is important for populism. Any name must be recognized, or taken up, by an audience, who 
can talk back in the name of the name, for instance in the name of “the people.”45 Through 
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repetition, the name of the people becomes a subject position that, while partly determined 
through the populist leader’s articulation of it, can function as the basis for resistance and re-
articulation. Even if popular is not the same as populist, the populist representation of the 
people must be popular in this sense that it must resonate with an audience, including those 
who are interpellated by the representation of the people. The populist leader or movement 
that singlehandedly manipulates the people in their own image is a fiction. Although Andrew 
Arato may be wrong to reduce Laclau’s theory of representation and populism to a one-way 
relationship, Laclau often veers in this direction.46 But if understood in the way I have 
suggested here, representation – populist or not – cannot be reduced to a one-way 
performative relationship, where a representative claim creates the represented out of the blue 
as if it were fully plastic. 
 
Representing the People: Equivalence, Empty Signifiers and Pluralism 
 
For Laclau, the people is an effect of populist discourse, and the people is representational in 
the sense that populism is not a reflection of an already existing people. The mechanism for 
the representation of a people is that different particular demands are articulated into a chain 
of equivalence. The equivalence is established negatively through a shared antagonistic 
opposition to the establishment, and positively through an empty signifier – for instance, a 
leader – representing the chain as a whole. The people, then, is a chain of equivalence, where 
the links between the different demands are contingent, and where the equivalence is not 
identity because the differences between the demands are not entirely cancelled out. The 
empty signifier is only tendentially empty because it is at once one among other signifiers (or 
                                                          
46 Andrew Arato, “Political Theology and Populism,” Social Research 80:1 (2013), pp. 161-
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demands) in the chain and represents the chain as a whole. The links between different parts 
of the people and the link between the empty signifier and the chain are representational: they 
are contingent, and they constitute the people in one way or another.47 
While contingent, the representation of the people is not accidental, but shaped and 
limited by existing meanings. Given that representation takes place in an already partly 
sedimented discursive terrain, some signifiers will be more likely than others to become 
representative of the people. The people – and the empty signifier representing it – is not 
necessarily gendered or racialized as suggested by Naomi Schor and Benjamin McKean.48 
This does not exclude an analysis of how, over time, the people has become associated with, 
for example, white, European males. It is precisely when we take the elevation of a particular 
signifier to play the role of empty signifier as contingent that such an empirical and historical 
analysis becomes possible and necessary. Thus, one might ask how emptiness has come to be 
associated with whiteness and masculinity, whereas non-whiteness and femininity have 
become associated with particularity and difference. And one might ask, how this plays out in 
different representations of the people, of who belongs to the people, and who does not.  
Although we cannot say a priori which identities are excluded from, and marginalized 
within, the people, we can say that there will always be exclusion and marginalization. There 
is first the antagonistic other – the establishment, for instance – which is excluded from the 
people. There is also what Laclau refers to as heterogeneity, namely identities that fit neither 
within the people nor on the other side of the antagonistic frontier.49 Within the chain of 
equivalence – that is, within the people – there is also heterogeneity because of the 
differences between different parts of the chain and between the empty signifier and parts of 
                                                          
47 Laclau, On Populist Reason, chapters 4 and 5. 
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Benjamin L. McKean, “Toward an Inclusive Populism? On the Role of Race and Difference 
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the chain. At the same time, some demands or identities are better represented by the empty 
signifier than others, and so the latter are marginalized. We end up with a people that is 
internally pluralist and fuzzy around the edges, but also a people that is striated and from 
which some will be excluded. For Laclau, there is no way to construct a people that is not 
marked by power relations and exclusion. At the same time, dis-articulation and re-
articulation is always possible because the moments of the people – to use Laclau and 
Mouffe’s terms from above – are never completely fixed. Not only are the different parts of 
the people partly floating, but so is the identity of the people.50 
In sum, for Laclau, the people is representational: the people does not exist, and so it 
must be represented in order to come into being. The representative claims constituting the 
people are only successful insofar as they draw on existing representations of the people and 
insofar as they are taken up by other agents; representation may be performative, but it is not 
an act of pure naming, as if such a thing were possible. Finally, there is no people without 
exclusion, but nor is there a people whose identity and limits can be fixed once and for all; 
the identity of the people is inherently floating, even if not always to the same degree. 
 
The People Does Not Exist 
 
To show the implications of Laclau’s theory of representation, I turn to Jan-Werner Müller’s 
critique of populism.51 Müller defends liberal democracy against populism and draws upon, 
among others, Jürgen Habermas and Claude Lefort. Müller’s examples of populism are 
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usually right-wing, authoritarian forms of populism, but he is also concerned with populism 
as a strategy for the Left in the current conjuncture of neoliberal technocracy.52 I bring Laclau 
and Müller into conversation around the nature and role of populist representations of the 
people. I will show how looking at populism through Laclau’s theory of representation helps 
explain what defenders of liberal democracy, such as Müller, find perilous about populism as 
well as showing the limitations of their critique of populism. 
On this Laclau and Müller agree, at least at first sight: the people does not exist, and 
therefore it needs to be represented. In Müller’s words: 
 
democratic representation … is not about a mechanical reproduction of objectively 
given interests and identities; rather, the latter are dynamically formed in the process 
of politicians (as well as civil society, friends, neighbors, etc.) making political offers 
of representation and citizens then responding in one way or another.53 
 
Laclau and Müller differ on how the people can be represented democratically. According to 
Müller, “populists claim that they, and only they, represent the people.”54 Not only that, but 
populists claim to transparently represent the will of the people, and that the people is 
“morally pure and fully unified.”55 Whereas Laclau believes that the populist people is 
                                                          
52 This much is also clear from Müller’s comments on Laclau’s work. Müller, “‘The people 
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heterogeneous and contestable, Müller concludes that “[t]he core claim of populism is … a 
moralized form of antipluralism.”56 
 Müller characterizes the populist representation of the people as “fictional,”57 an 
“illusion,”58 and a “fantasy.”59 The populist representation of the people is “symbolic,”60 and 
this is opposed to the representation of the people through “existing democratic 
procedures.”61 This is the crux of the matter. Müller is not saying that it is illegitimate to 
represent the people. In fact, for him, democracy consists of the competition between 
contestable representative claims, including claims to represent the people.62 However, those 
claims only take on a “proper democratic form” insofar as they are mediated by the right 
institutions;63 this mediation prevents the moral and political closure that populism aims at, 
according to Müller. Those institutions are the institutions of liberal/constitutional 
democracy, what Müller also calls intermediate institutions, following Nadia Urbinati.64 Here 
the demise of the political party is singled out because political parties institutionalize the 
competition between representative claims.65 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 20. 
57 Müller, “‘The people Must be Extracted from Within the People,’” pp. 485, 487, 491; 
Müller, What Is Populism?, pp. 20, 27. 
58 Müller, “‘The people Must be Extracted from Within the People,’” p. 491; Müller, What Is 
Populism?, p. 28. 
59 Müller, “‘The people Must be Extracted from Within the People,’” p. 491. 
60 Müller, What Is Populism?, pp. 27, 34, 39. There is no direct reference here to Hannah 
Pitkin’s account of symbolic representation, but Müller’s argument is similar to Pitkin’s. 
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967), chapter 5. For Laclau on Pitkin, see Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 159-63; 
for critiques of Laclau’s reading of Pitkin, see Arato, “Political Theology and Populism,” pp. 
160-2; and Disch, “The Impurity of Representation and the Vitality of Democracy.” 
61 Müller, What Is Populism?, p. 27. 
62 Ibid., pp. 68-71. 
63 Ibid., p. 68. 
64 Ibid., pp. 35-7. Nadia Urbinati, “A Revolt against Intermediary Bodies.” Constellations 
22:4 (2015), pp. 477-86. 
65 Müller, What Is Populism?, pp. 78-9. Similarly, Carami, “Will Vs. Reason.” 
24 
 
 Symbolic representations of the people are opposed to “empirical” ones.66 
“Empirical” here refers to “the people in its empirical entirety” and “the actual input and 
continuous influence by citizens divided amongst themselves.”67 In the case of empirical 
claims, the people speaks through liberal democratic institutions; in the case of symbolic 
claims, the people is spoken for, and constructed by, the populist leader.68 In the first case, we 
have pluralism, in the second case, monism. The difference is that, in the second case, 
representation is one-way: from populist leader to the people. This is why, for Müller, 
populist representative claims are manipulative. Therefore, although empirical representative 
claims are given legitimacy through electoral competition, even when populists win elections, 
they do not have “automatic democratic legitimacy,” because the populist representation is 
inherently manipulative.69 
By contrast, Müller’s “people of individuals” is constituted as the people by the 
liberal democratic institutions, for instance by citizenship and voting rights as well as by 
institutional limits on what are legitimate representative claims.70 However, institutions are 
not transparent media for the expression of what Müller calls “the people in its empirical 
entirety;” the “empirical” people must first be identified as the people, and this is the 
“symbolic” dimension of representation. Any set of institutions will express – represent – an 
image of who belongs and how they belong. Müller almost concedes the point when he writes 
that he “has tacitly taken for granted the existence of an actual people as an empirically 
verifiable number.”71 He has indeed, but he insists that the populist answer to the boundary 
problem – the question of who belongs, and who does not belong, to the people – “is based 
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on a fiction.”72 Yet, there is no solution to the boundary problem that is not based on a 
“fiction,” because the people does not exist other than as representations of it. If the people is 
representational, it is constituted in the terrain of representation, whether through 
representative claims by a populist leader or through the representative claims sedimented in 
liberal democratic institutions. The people is symbolic and fictional, but not as opposed to an 
actual people that exists elsewhere; there is no empirical people independently of a symbolic 
people. We cannot go back to the view of representation that divides the world into two 
levels: an empirical people and a symbolic people. This is why Laclau argues that democracy 
is always representative: the demos of democracy cannot rule in an unmediated way, and it 
only exists as an effect of representations of it, whether by populists or by liberal democratic 
institutions. There is no demos – neither as a collection of individuals nor as substantive 
community – that can speak in an unmediated way. Müller is right when he writes that the 
populist claim to directly represent the people is always mediated by the particularity of the 
leader.73 But this extends to any representation of the people, including the institutions 
framing the competition between representations of the people. There is no unmediated 
people. 
The mediation – that is, representation – of the people does not amount to a one-way 
relationship where a populist movement or a political institution fixes the limits of the people 
once and for all. The “symbolic” constitution of the people can always be contested. This is 
so because, as argued above, the representative claim about the people depends for its effect 
on being taken up, and so people can talk back in the name of the representative claim: 
“that’s not our people,” “we are also part of the people,” and so on.  Representation is the 
terrain of democracy, and so we can think of democracy as a regime where different 
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representations – for instance, representations of the people – struggle for hegemony. And for 
Laclau, it is important to multiply the sites of representation of the people, a point very much 
in line with Müller.74 
 
Pluralist Populism? 
 
One of the most contentious issues surrounding populism today is its relationship to 
pluralism. As I have shown, for Laclau, populism is always pluralist, but also always 
exclusionary. This is important in the context of a distinction Laclau makes between internal 
(populist) and external (ethno-populist) frontiers of the people.75 Whereas populism always 
divides the people from within (for instance, “we are the 99%”) and is always pluralist, 
“[t]here is no possibility of pluralism for ethno-populism,” which Laclau does not count as 
populism proper.76 Ethno-populism corresponds to Müller’s populism of “we are the 100%,” 
that is, “we are the whole people.”77 While it is not entirely clear from Laclau’s text whether 
“ethno-populism” is a variant of populism or something entirely different, he gives as 
examples the nationalisms of the former Yugoslavia. 
Laclau’s populist people is not one. The unity of the people never arrives, and there is 
no people without exclusion, and so any representation of the people is haunted by, and can 
be questioned in the name of, the gap between the people and the particular representation of 
it. This must also apply to what Laclau calls ethno-populism: given the constitutive character 
of representation, no discourse – including an ethno-populist one – asserting a homogeneous 
people will be successful in realizing homogeneity, and the claim to closure and wholeness 
                                                          
74 Laclau, Emancipation(s), p. 99. 
75 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 196-8. 
76 Ibid., p. 196. 
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will always be just that: a claim. This sort of claim can still have profound effects when the 
link between a charismatic leader and the people becomes so sedimented that dissenters are 
persecuted in the name of the people. Laclau uses Mugabe in Zimbabwe as an example of 
this, where populism turns into authoritarianism, and he opposes Mugabe to Nyerere in 
Tanzania. In the case of Mugabe, the vertical relationship between the leader/regime 
completely trumps the horizontal relations among the heterogeneous parts of the people, and 
so “we can no longer speak of populism.”78 In the case of Nyerere, “a democratic balance” 
between verticality and horizontality ensured that agonistic struggles between different 
representations of the people could take place.79 The point remains that there is nothing in 
Laclau’s theory that predetermines an anti-pluralist populism, but nor is there anything that 
precludes more homogeneous and exclusionary representations of the people. The question of 
what kind of populism we have in front of us is a context-specific political question in need 
of empirical analysis.  
The relationship between populism and pluralism is important for current debates 
about left populism. For Laclau and for Mouffe, there is no doubt that left populism can be 
pluralist; for them, pluralism goes hand in hand with the contingent nature of identities and 
institutions.80 Others, like Müller, are skeptical, while Fabio Wolkenstein argues that it is 
possible to combine populism and liberal pluralism under certain conditions.81 Others try to 
get around the problem of the relationship between populism and pluralism by distinguishing 
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between exclusive (roughly right-wing) and inclusive (roughly left-wing) populism. Yannis 
Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis do so from a Laclauian position; Cas Mudde and 
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser from a position similar to that of Müller.82 The risk is that 
“exclusive” and “inclusive” simply become redescriptions of what we think are “bad” and 
“good” populisms respectively. The same can be said about Laclau’s distinction between 
populism proper and ethno-populism. Following Laclau, any populism – and any political 
ideology or regime – will be exclusive to some extent. And, even if the closure and the 
homogenization are never complete, they are inherent risks of any political discourse, 
including populism in all its forms. We may be able to distinguish between more or less 
exclusive, but that distinction will be framed by a particular political discourse. A pluralist 
left populist government might criminalize homophobic behavior, for instance, thus limiting 
pluralism in the name of pluralism. In other words, we cannot dissociate the question of how 
exclusive a representation of the people is from what is being excluded. This suggests that 
populism in itself is not necessarily a threat to pluralism, but particular – populist or not – 
representations of the people may be.83 
 
Conclusion: The Populist Moment 
 
                                                          
82 Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis, “Left-Wing Populism in the European 
Periphery: The Case of SYRIZA,” Journal of Political Ideologies 19:2 (2014), pp. 119-42; 
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: 
Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America,” Government and Opposition 48:2 
(2013), pp. 147-74 
83 Stengel, MacDonald and Nabers, “Introduction,” p. 4. Johannes Plagemann and Sandra 
Destradi use Müller’s definition of populism as anti-elite and anti-pluralist, but end up 
concluding that these two features have not had any significant effect on India’s foreign 
policy. “Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India,” Foreign Policy Analysis AOP 3 
December 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/ory010, pp. 3-4, 15. 
29 
 
Laclau takes representation to be performative, and a populist discourse is a discourse that 
performatively constructs a people. Müller agrees that the people does not exist, but sees 
populism as a form of manipulation where a homogenous identity is forced on the pluralism 
of society. I have argued with and against Laclau that the populist claim to represent the 
people must be recognized in order to be effective. As a result, one can always speak back in 
the name of the people, and pluralism is inherent to populism – even if some forms of 
populism attempt to eradicate this pluralism. 
Müller writes of populism that it “is something like a permanent shadow of modern 
representative democracy, and a constant peril.”84 With Laclau, I have argued that, insofar as 
it shows the representational character of the people of democracy, populism is indeed a 
permanent shadow of democracy. But it is a shadow that does not so much threaten 
democracy as disclose how it works. The risk of anti-pluralism associated with populism is 
not specific to populism, but a risk of any discourse, including democratic ones. 
Where does that leave those who want popular mobilization, but not in the form of 
right-wing populism? Müller believes we are faced with a choice between, on one side, 
neoliberal technocracy or populism and, on the other side, a combination of liberal 
democracy and social-democracy. He proposes “democratic activism” as a way to ensure that 
the latter does not turn into the former.85 Democratic activists claim that they too are part of 
the people, and he gives the Spanish indignados as an example. Müller wants to avoid a 
choice of either populist rupture or co-optation, and Müller interprets Laclau as offering a 
simplistic choice between populism and technocracy.86 There is something to be said for this 
interpretation of Laclau who opposes the anti-institutionalism of populism to the 
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institutionalism of what he calls administration.87 However, when it comes to the cases he 
discusses, Laclau is much more nuanced.88 This leaves room for thinking about combinations 
of populist rupture and institutionalist politics, as well as combinations of activism and 
institutionalist politics, where representations of the people struggle for hegemony. It is a 
struggle for hegemony that takes place not just within liberal democratic institutions, but also 
shapes those very institutions. 
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